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Abstract: Virtually all public policies regarding taxation and the redistribution of income rely on 
explicit or implicit assumptions about the long run effect of wages rates on labor supply. The available 
estimates of the wage elasticity of male labor supply in the literature have varied between −0.2 and 
0.2, implying that permanent wage increases have relatively small, poorly determined effects on labor 
supplied. The variation in existing estimates calls for a simple, natural experiment in which men can 
change their hours of work, and in which wages have been exogenously and permanently changed. 
We introduce a panel data set of taxi drivers who choose their own hours, and who experienced two 
exogenous permanent fare increases instituted by the New York City Taxi and Limousine 
Commission, and we use these data to fit a simple structural labor supply function. Our estimates 
suggest that the elasticity of labor supply is about −0.2, implying that income effects dominate 
substitution effects in the long run labor supply of males. 
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  The effect of wage rates on long run labor supply is a key ingredient in the 
discussion of virtually all public policies regarding taxation, social safety nets, and the 
redistribution of income.  Although there is a relatively broad consensus that the long run 
elasticity of labor supply is not likely to be large, especially for adult males, this 
consensus is a result of many individual studies that face a litany of familiar limitations.
1
Our analysis relies on a new panel dataset of New York City taxi drivers who 
choose their own work hours, and who experienced two exogenous, permanent increases 
in their real wages.  New York taxi drivers either own or lease taxi “medallions,” which 
  
The two most serious problems in studying worker preferences between income and 
leisure that modern studies face are (a) the inability of most workers to alter their hours of 
work without changing jobs and (b) the consequent inability of the analyst to measure 
exogenous changes in wages that workers face.  Our goal in this paper is to provide a 
straightforward analysis of the labor supply of workers whose hours are flexible in 
response to an exogenous wage increase.  To do this we have deliberately selected data 
for a group where a transparent econometric analysis is feasible, rather than apply more 
complex methods to a broad based and representative data set.  Needless to say, our 
approach has the obvious advantage of transparency, while suffering from the 
disadvantage that it may not be appropriate to generalize our findings to other 
populations. 
                                                 
1 See the comprehensive and influential surveys by Pencavel (1986), Heckman and Killingsworth (1986), 
and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for the details.  Formal evidence that workers face constraints on hours 
worked within jobs dates from at least Ham (1982) and Altonji and Paxson (1988). 3 
 
give them the right to collect passengers when hailed on the street, subject to a number of 
rules and regulations, including the fees they may charge.  This economic environment 
provides a straightforward method for estimating the labor supply response to a wage 
change, if one occurs. Our data indicate that work responses to exogenous increases in 
the fare structure are small, and negative.  Worker wages, on the other hand, are strongly 
affected by increases in the fare structure.  Taken together the evidence implies that the 
long run uncompensated elasticity of labor supply lies around -.2, and that it may be 
estimated in our data with considerable precision. 
Taxi drivers have been the subject of several studies that attempt to use the time 
series behavior of individual drivers who face stable fare structures to study intertemporal 
substitution and reference dependence in driver preferences.  (See Farber (2005) and the 
references therein.)  However, absent the observation of exogenous, permanent wage 
changes, these papers cannot measure long run labor supply parameters and they do not 
attempt to do so. 
In the next section of the paper we provide a brief discussion of the New York 
City taxi industry.  We then introduce our new data set on taxi revenues and fares, set out 
a simple theoretical model of taxi driver incentives, and discuss the empirical results.  
The final section contains some brief concluding remarks and indicates some of the 
implications of our findings for future research. 
 
II. Taxis in New York 4 
 
  There are five main types of cabs in New York City: yellow taxis, car services, 
black cars, limousines, and illegal so-called gitney cabs.
 2
  In 2006, there were 12,779 yellow taxis in New York City, out of a total of about 
46,000 legal taxis, car service, and black car vehicles.  The yellow taxis concentrate on 
serving Manhattan residents, who are transported in 71% of their trips.  As of 2002, “two-
thirds of Manhattan residents used cabs for work and/or personal trips at least some of the 
time,” and overall, “Manhattan adults hail a cab an average of 100 times a year” (Schaller 
2006).  In turn, “90% of all taxi trips originate in Manhattan” (Schaller 2006).  Yellow 
taxis are thus an important part of the Manhattan transportation system, with “8.5 yellow 
. . . taxis per 1,000 Manhattan residents in 2005” (Schaller 2006). 
  Only yellow cabs are legally 
allowed to accept passengers from street hails, and this – along with hails from 
passengers waiting in lines at airports, train stations, and hotels – is the only legal source 
of passengers for yellow cabs.  All taxi and livery services are regulated by the New York 
City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC). 
  The only way to legally drive a yellow taxi is with a taxi license: “a painted 
aluminum medallion . . . which is affixed to the hood of every yellow . . . cab” (Schaller 
2006).  The number of medallions is determined by the TLC, and has not varied much 
from around 12,000 for the past 60 years.  There are three main ways to get access to a 
medallion: (1) buying one on the open market; (2) renting one for long-term periods of 
time as a “named driver”; and (3) renting a medallion one shift at a time as an “unnamed 
driver.”  Individually-owned cabs are now required to “be driven 210 shifts per year by 
the medallion owner, for licenses transferred since 1990,” although there is some 
question about whether the required number of shifts is enforced (Schaller 2006). 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive source, on which we rely for much of the following material, is Bruce Schaller (2006). 5 
 
  The TLC also sets the fares that taxis must charge.  A taxi trip begins with a fare 
drop: a large charge that is accrued as soon as the cab drives for more than a short 
distance (this distance has ranged from 1/7 to 1/5 of a mile since 1952).  After this, the 
passengers are charged for mileage (when the cab is moving more than 12mph) and wait 
time (when the cab is stopped or moving less than 12 mph).  Finally, there are and have 
been various surcharges for trips beginning during certain times of the day, and various 
flat fares for trips to and/or from specific airports. 
  Since July 1952, the TLC has changed the fares 13 times.  In nominal dollars, the 
fare drop has increased from $0.25 for the first 1/5 mile to $2.50 for the first 1/5 mile, the 
charge per mile has increased from $0.20 to $2.00, and the charge per minute has 
increased from $0.03 to $0.40.  Average fares have increased from $0.83 to $9.61. 
  The recent fare increases analyzed in this paper (March 1996 and May 2004) have 
resulted in increased total revenue per hour (i.e., the number of passengers hailing cabs 
did not decline enough to offset additional revenue from higher fares per trip), which 
suggests that the demand for taxis is inelastic.  It is possible to interpret some of these 
fare increases as accounting for inflation, however after the 2004 fare increase, drivers’ 
real cash incomes exceeded “driver incomes in 1929 for the first time since the Crash” 
(Schaller 2006).  This suggests that there have been long-term changes in drivers’ real net 
hourly wages that have been precipitated in part by nominal fare changes instituted by the 
TLC. 
  In the next section, we discuss the data we use to analyze the response of taxicab 
drivers to two changes in real revenue per mile that were brought about by the 1996 and 




  The City of New York’s Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) inspects each 
yellow taxicab three times a year at its central inspection facility.  The data used in this 
paper is the TLC’s complete set of official inspection records from September 1994 
through December 2005.  Each inspection record includes the medallion number, the 
registered type of driving arrangement (owner-driver, owner-driver with another driver, 
named driver, or unnamed driver), the odometer reading, the taximeter reading, and the 
date of the inspection.  From these data, we can calculate the number of days since the 
last inspection (always about 4 months), the month in which the inspection took place (to 
capture seasonal effects), the number of miles driven since the last inspection, and the 
revenue earned since the last inspection. 
  The measure of labor supply that we construct from these data is the number of 
miles driven.  With a constant average speed (which we take to be driver specific in the 
analysis below), miles driven is a good measure of hours worked, and thus of labor 
supply.  However, it should be clear that although hours worked and miles driven are 
highly related, they are not identical.  The primary difference will be due to waiting time 
that results in passenger revenue, but that does not result from miles being driven.  We 
suspect that the primary place where this happens is where cabs are waiting in a line at an 
airport or a hotel, for the purpose of shuttling passengers between the two.  However, as 
of 1990, only four percent of all yellow taxi trips began or ended in La Guardia or 
Kennedy airports (the number at Newark airport was negligible).  (Schaller 2006)  This 7 
 
implies that most taxi drivers are probably cruising on Manhattan streets when they are 
looking for a passenger, so that miles driven and hours worked will be closely related.
3
The corresponding real net revenue earned  per mile driven in a given four month 
period is the real revenue earned during that period minus the real costs, divided by the 
number of miles driven.  We use as our measure of the real earnings from driving a mile 
the real revenues divided by the number of miles driven.  Holding velocity and real costs 
constant, the average real revenue per mile is proportional to the average hourly wage.  In 
the interest of holding real costs constant, which we presume are primarily fixed, we 
exclude from our sample all medallions that are being leased by their drivers (named 
drivers, and unnamed drivers), since real lease rates change over time. 
 
  Since we are interested in estimating the labor supply of taxi drivers, not of 
taxicabs, we would like each observation to be for a particular driver.  To help achieve 
this, we also exclude from our sample all medallions owned by a driver who rents out his 
medallion to another driver for the complementary shifts.  Finally, we exclude from our 
data set all records in which the inspection took place more than 365 days before one of 
the fare increases, records in which the inspection took place less than four months after 
one of the fare increases (this eliminates inspection periods that straddle both sides of the 
fare increase), and records in which the inspection took place more than four months plus 
365 days after a fare increase. 
  We are left with a total of 19,134 observations (inspections) of 2,637 medallions, 
where each medallion at any point in time is driven by an individual owner-driver.
4
                                                 
3 The potential linkage between driver labor supply and miles driven would ideally be studied with some 
measure of actual hours worked or clocked, which is not available at this time.  However, in our analyses 
we do control for driver fixed effects and for month variability and it seems likely that much of the 
systematic variation in driver down time that otherwise exists will be unrelated to the timing of fare 
changes. 
  8 
 
These observations cover the labor supplied by these drivers from: March 1st, 1995 
through February 9
th, 1996; from July 1
st, 1996 through July 1
st, 1997; from May 12
th 
2003 through May 3
rd, 2004; and from September 7
th, 2004 through September 7
th, 2005.  
Our data covers an average of 825 days for each medallion, with a standard deviation of 
368 days. 
  We do not know with certainty that each observation represents the work of one 
driver, since the driver associated with a medallion at the beginning of an inspection 
period may have sold his medallion before the next inspection.  We also do not know for 
sure that the driver associated with a medallion in one year is necessarily the same driver 
associated with that medallion in another year.  However, we do know the total number 
of taxi medallion sales each month from January 1990 through December 2005.  On 
average, only 18 exchanges of privately-owned medallions occur each month, meaning 
that within the average inspection period less than three percent of medallions change 
hands.  Some of these should actually involve sales to corporations that lease medallions, 
thus removing drivers from our sample, not matching new drivers to existing medallions. 
Our medallion fixed effects are thus only a proxy for driver-level fixed effects.  Since at 
most three percent of these medallions changed hands in any given period, most 
medallions must have stayed in the hands of the same owner drivers during the small 
periods of time before and after each fare change, which implies that our primary analysis 
should not be affected. 
We report summary statistics from these data in Table 1, and a very simple pre-
post analysis of differences in miles driven and revenue received per mile in Table 2a 
(the full panel) and Table 2b (a balanced subset of the full panel).  The basic data 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Only 2,535 of these medallions have sufficient meter information for revenue and related calculations. 9 
 
surrounding the fare structure increases are also reported in Figures 1 and 2.  It is clear 
from the figures that the real average revenue per mile was higher in the three years after 
each fare change than in the years before, suggesting that we can measure the labor 
supply response of owner-drivers to changes in real wages using the fare changes as an 
instrument.  The figures also are consistent with only a small, and perhaps negative, 
permanent change in miles driven in response to the fare changes.  Taken at face value, 
the simple division of the proportionate change in miles driven by the proportionate 
change in revenue per mile provides a measure of the uncompensated labor supply 
elasticity.  For the balanced sample of data these estimates are all roughly -5%/20%=-.25.  
As we shall see below, this is close to the estimate obtained from a more complete 
econometric analysis. 
   
IV. A Simple Model of Behavior for Taxi Driver Labor Supply 
  What is apparent from the previous discussion is that drivers do not face explicit 
wage rates, but instead face a taxi fare function that relates their income to hours worked 
through the miles they travel.  A simple model of this behavior starts with the standard 
assumption that a driver has utility function 
(1) u=u(h,y), 
where h is hours worked and y is income from driving, and uh<0, uy> 0.  A worker also 
faces a schedule relating work to income  
(2) y=g(h;θ), 
where θ represents the parametric part of the fare structure.  The driver optimizes by 
working at a point where 10 
 
(3) - uh / uy = gh , 
the rate of substitution of leisure for goods equals the marginal effect of hours on income. 
  A convenient parameterization to the rate of substitution function - uh / uy  is - uh / 
uy  = αh
ß , while g(h;θ)= θh is a first order approximation for the earnings function, and 
we can thus measure θ as revenue per mile driven. The function αh
ß captures the notion 
that whether the uncompensated labor supply function is positively or negatively sloped 
depends on whether the rate of substitution of leisure for goods increases or decreases at 
higher work hours.
 5
  These assumptions lead to a supply function of the form 
   There is nothing in the conventional theory of labor/leisure choice 
that compels either to be the case, so that the issue is entirely an empirical one. 
(4) ln(h)=(1/ß)lnθ – ln(α/ß),  
which is a straightforward log linear regression.  In principle, in this setup fixed effects 
for individual drivers have the interpretation as variation in α, which affects the level of 
hours worked, but does not affect the response of hours worked with respect to the wage 
rate.  Note that because of our linear approximation g(h,y)= θh, we are assuming that 
individual drivers face perfectly elastic demand schedules for hours worked.
6
  Our estimation strategy is straightforward.  We first fit reduced from equations for 
revenue per mile (θ) and miles driven (h) as functions of monthly dummy variables for 
the month in which an inspection is observed, a measure of the number of days since the 
previous inspection, and an indicator for the fare structure in place.  We then fit the labor 
   
                                                 
5 This functional form was first apparently used by Burtless and Hausman (1978) and the implied utility 
function and other aspects of it are discussed extensively by Stern (1986). 
6 It is important to understand that, even though the demand curve for aggregate taxi rides is downward 
sloping, this is not the demand curve that individual drivers face  Our assumption about the driver’s 
revenue function implies that an individual driver may drive as much as they like at the equilibrium price in 
the aggregate market. 11 
 
supply function (4) by ordinary least squares and also using the fare indicator variables as 
instruments.  In this context, the fare structure instruments serve two purposes.  They 
permit us both to identify a shift along a labor supply function from an exogenous shift in 
the wage, and they also serve to correct for measurement error that results from the 




V. Empirical Results 
  Our identification of the effect of the wage rate on labor supply depends on 
observing an exogenous wage increase that is not confounded by other factors that would 
affect labor supply.  We use exogenous fare increases for this purpose.  It is hard to 
imagine precisely what other factors would be likely to serve as confounding factors.  
Factors such as unpredictable increases in the demand for taxi rides (as from a 
spontaneous demand shock) would not be permanent, while most other shocks would be 
related to the seasonal or individual driver fixed effects for which we control.
8
(A) The Uncompensated Wage-Elasticity of Labor Supply 
 
  We report the first stage results of regressing revenue/ per mile driven on the fare 
dummy variables and some other control variables in Table 3.  It is apparent that the fare 
increases are associated with an average 19% increase in revenue per mile, and that this 
effect is precisely measured.  It is also notable that both the month dummies and the 
                                                 
7 This measurement error tends to produce an automatic negative correlation between miles driven and 
revenue per mile, because the former is contained in the denominator of the latter.  Measurement errors in 
miles driven thus results in a spurious negative correlation between miles driven and revenue per mile.  See 
especially Farber (2005) for a discussion of this issue.  
8 One exception might be gasoline prices, which is an important cost for a driver.  However, gasoline prices 
were very stable in the period surrounding the 1996 fare increase.  Gasoline prices were on an increasing 
path during the period surrounding the 2004 fare increase, which would imply that we have somewhat 
underestimated  the increase in real revenues per mile driven and therefore underestimated (in absolute 
value) the labor supply elasticity. 12 
 
“days since inspection” variables have very small coefficients, implying that reporting 
month deviations in revenue per mile are typically within 1 to 3 percent.
9
 We also report the reduced from regression of miles driven on the fare dummy 
variables and some other control variables in Table 4.  The results indicate that miles 
driven decline from 2 to 4 percent following a fare increase, depending on the 
specification.  The more appropriate specification, which controls for medallion fixed 
effects, indicates an average 4.2 percent decline in miles driven.  In this exactly identified 
model, the ratio of these two reduced from estimates is precisely our instrumental 
variables estimate. 
 
 The instrumental variables estimates are reported in Table 5.  In what we 
consider the most appropriate specification, using fixed effects, we estimate an 
uncompensated labor supply elasticity of -.23, with a standard error only about one-tenth 
that size.  This is our preferred estimate of these drivers’ uncompensated wage-elasticity 
of labor supply and it is estimated with considerable precision. 
  There are two other determinants of labor supply that might well have changed at 
the same time that the fare changed and as a result of its change: (a) the drivers’ incentive 
to rent their medallion to others may have increased because of the increased medallion 
rental rate, and (b) the value of the medallion on the medallion transaction market may 
have increased.  We examine these issues in order to see what, if any, effect they may 
have on the interpretations of our primary empirical results.   
  (B) The Change in the Medallion Rental Rate. 
                                                 
9 Recall from the discussion above that the “month” dummy variables record the month that the taxi 
inspection took place.  These inspections cover a 4 month period.  Thus, the coefficients on the month 
dummies are linear combinations of effects that would be estimated with dummy variables that measured 
the revenue per mile in an actual calendar month. 13 
 
  We do not observe the medallion rental rates over time.  However, we know that 
in 1996 the TLC raised the cap medallion lease, but that in 2004 the TLC only raised the 
cap medallion lease rate by 8% in order that most of the fare increase “would end up in 
drivers’ pockets.”  (See the timeline in the appendix for more details.)  Although we 
cannot document all the details there is a potential for large changes in the lease rate 
around the time of the fare changes that might affect the labor supply of drivers who 
owned medallions, despite the fact that these lease rates do not affect them directly, 
because of the potential incentives a change in the lease rate might give an owner driver. 
  For example, this change in the incentive to lease to others could potentially cause 
at least one serious bias: it could selectively remove people from our sample after the fare 
increase, because they then start renting their evening shift to others. 
  Since our data set has the universe of drivers inspected by the TLC between 1990 
and 2005  we may examine the number of medallions that switched from being 
associated with an owner-driver to being associated with both an owner-driver and 
another driver, after the fare increases were announced.  The data on switchers shows that 
this type of selection affected less than one percent of our sample
10
  (C) The Change in the Price of the Medallion 
.  Thus, it seems 
unlikely that increased medallion renting has any effect on our results. 
  The New York City taxi medallion is a major asset.  In December 2005, the 
average nominal transaction price in the market for individual medallions was $350,000.  
                                                 
10 There are 17 medallions in our sample that were owner-driver medallions as of March 2004, but became 
medallions associated with both an owner-driver and another driver after March 2004 (i.e., after the 
announcement of the fare increase).  Assuming that all of these drivers sought out partners because of the 
increased lease rates, this would mean that the selection rate was 17 out of the total of 2705 medallions in 
our sample.  According to our data, no medallions that were associated only with an owner-driver before 
the 1996 fare increase later appear as associated with an owner-driver and another driver after the 1996 fare 
increase.  Dividing 17 over 2705 gives a selection rate of under 1%. 14 
 
A change in the medallion’s value occurring at the same time as the fare change could 
lead to two biases: (a) it could selectively remove people from our sample, because they 
sell their medallion in response to the jump in its value; and (b) for those who remain in 
our sample, it might affect their labor supply via an additional income effect.  We can 
examine the selections issue (a) by looking at the number of individually-owned 
medallions sold around the time of the fare changes.  We regress the number of 
medallions sold per month on the dummy for post-fare-increase and on month-of-the-
year dummies.  In results not reported, we find that the fare increases are associated with 
an extra 1.4 medallions sold per month, or 17 extra per year, and the increase is not 
statistically significant.  This point estimate thus suggests that perhaps 1% of our sample 
selected to leave through selling their medallions, which seems unlikely to affect our 
results.  
  Finally, to examine possible income effects due to medallion price increases we 
examined the time series of monthly average medallion prices reported in Schaller 
(2006).  Medallions trade in an open, public market and the prices are likely to be 
affected by many factors, including whether the City increases their supply, which they 
do from time to time (see the Timeline in the appendix), and on caps that the TLC places 
on lease rates.  Clearly both the former and the latter are likely to drive prices down. The 
time series around the 1996 fare increase does not provide any evidence of medallion 
price increases, but the time series around the 2004 fare is more suggestive.  It is clear 
that starting around September 2001 there was an upward trend in the price of 
medallions.  It is clear that between September 2001 and April 2004 (when the new fare 
was announced), the trend in prices was almost linear, whereas as soon as the new fare 15 
 
took effect in May, the trend began to be broken.  Fitting the data between September 
2001 and April 2004 to a linear time trend shows that a rate of increase of $1,834 per 
month gives an R-squared of 0.95.  This trend may thus represent a good counterfactual 
for what would have happened if the fare change had not been implemented.  Using this 
counterfactual, we calculate that by December 2005, when our data set ends, the 
medallions were priced at $53,000 more than they would have been without the fare 
change. 
  Is a $50,000 increase in the value of a medallion likely to affect the continuing 
labor supply of an owner-driver separately from the wage increase with which it is 
associated?  The answer to this question depends on the foresight and age of a driver.  To 
the extent that the owner-driver continues to work and expects to do so for a long time, 
the income effect produced by the fare increase is entirely captured by the observed fare 
increase, just as any permanent wage increase affects a worker’s lifetime income.  
However, for workers with shorter horizons, there may be other effects. 
  .According to revenue information from our data set and cost information from 
The 2006 New York City Taxi Fact Book, the drivers in our sample could expect to 
generate net earnings of about $50,000 per year over the course of their careers, so the 
medallion price increase is about equivalent to a single year of pay. Assuming an average 
career length of 30 years, the medallion price increase would constitute about 3% of 
lifetime income, while the medallion price increase would increase lifetime income by 
only about 3%.  This suggests that any direct effects of the medallion price increase on 




  Our results imply that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity for taxi drivers is 
almost certainly negative and small.  This will come as no surprise to those who know the 
extensive literature devoted to the study of male labor supply.  In addition, this finding is 
consistent with a broad variety of historical evidence that suggests that the massive 
increases in real wages seen in the United States and Europe since 1879 have been 
accompanied by significant declines in annual hours worked per worker.  It is also 
consistent with the evidence that work hours are longer in poorer countries than in richer 
ones. 
  An important limitation of our results is that they capture only one margin on 
which labor supply is adjusted, neglecting especially issues of labor force participation 
and retirement. These participation issues may loom especially large for groups whose 
attachment to the labor force is not as strong as the primarily adult male workers who 
make up the bulk of taxi drivers. 
  Our results have important implications for much of the continuing discussion of 
tax and transfer programs in many countries.  Many of these discussions continue to 
operate in nearly complete ignorance of the extensive scientific evidence about labor 
supply behavior that has been accumulated over the last four decades.  No doubt this is a 
product, in part, of wishful thinking, but results like those in this paper, replicated in a 
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Table 1: Simple Statistics 
 
 
Simple Statistics: by inspection 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
           
owner-driver? 
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 
0.49  0.50  0  1  102275 
Days since the last 
inspection 
 
122 days  4 days  40 days  237 days  102275 
























Revenue earned since the 
last inspection 
 
$21,597  $8,465  $,3007  $68,536  67317 












Revenue earned per mile 











Real revenue earned per 














Simple Statistics: by medallion 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
           
owner-driver? 
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 
0.40  0.38  0  1  4658 
Number of Inspections 
 






Table 2a:  Simple Difference Table: 
(Medallion Fixed Effects; no other controls) 
 
  Change in Revenue per Mile  Change in Miles Driven  
 
1996 Fare Increase  + $0.14               (+ 17 %)  - 477 miles               (- 3.2 %) 
2004 Fare Increase  + $0.15               (+ 19 %)  - 824 miles               (- 5.6 %) 
 
All changes are computed as the coefficient of a dummy variable indicating the year 
noted and are significant at the 0.1% level.  Revenue is in December 2005 Dollars.  Miles 
driven measures the number of miles driven since the last inspection.  The average 
number of days between inspections is 122 (4 months) with a standard deviation of 4 
days.  Since the panel is not fully balanced, these results are computed from a regression 





(Medallion Fixed Effects; controls for month and days since last inspection) 
 
  Change in Revenue per Mile  Change in Miles Driven 
 
1996 Fare Increase  + $0.14               (+ 17 %)  - 399 miles              (- 2.7 %) 
2004 Fare Increase  + $0.15               (+ 19 %)  - 818 miles              (- 5.6 %) 
 
All changes are computed as the coefficient of a dummy variable indicating the year 
noted and are significant at the 0.1% level.  Revenue is in December 2005 Dollars.  Miles 
driven measures the number of miles driven since the last inspection.  The average 
number of days between inspections is 122 (4 months) with a standard deviation of 4 
days. Since the panel is not fully balanced, these results are computed from a regression 
that includes medallion fixed effects in order to use all the data.  The regressions in this 














Table 2b: Simple Difference Table (Balanced Panel): 
(no other controls) 
 
  Change in Revenue per Mile  Change in Miles Driven  
 
1996 Fare Increase  + $0.15***         (+ 19.2 %)  - 819 miles*             (- 5.6 %) 
2004 Fare Increase  + $0.15***         (+ 20.9 %)  - 764 miles**           (- 5.1 %) 
 
Difference Table: 
(controls for month and days since last inspection) 
 
  Change in Revenue per Mile  Change in Miles Driven 
 
1996 Fare Increase  + $0.15***         (+ 19.0 %)  - 758 miles*            (- 5.2 %) 
2004 Fare Increase  + $0.15***         (+ 20.9 %)  - 758 miles**          (- 5.1 %) 
 
All changes labeled with *** are significant at the 0.1% level; those with ** are 
significant at the 1% level, and those with * at the 10% level.  Revenue is in December 
2005 Dollars.  Miles driven measures the number of miles driven since the last 
inspection.  The average number of days between inspections is 122.6 with a standard 



























Table 3: (Log) Revenue per Mile as a Function of the Fare Changes 
  (First stages of specifications (2) and (4) in Table 5) 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  OLS  Fixed Effects 
Post fare increase*  0.19  0.19 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
ln(days since inspection)  -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.05)  (0.03) 
February  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
March  -0.00  -0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
April  -0.02  -0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
May  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
June  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
July  -0.01  -0.05 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
August  -0.03  -0.07 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
September  -0.02  -0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.00) 
October  -0.04  -0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
November  -0.02  -0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
December  -0.03  -0.07 
  (0.01)  (0.04) 
Constant  -0.18  -0.21 
  (0.24)  (0.15) 
Observations  12281  12281 
R-squared  0.24  0.53 
# of Medallions    2514 
Standard errors in parentheses     
 
Unit of Observation:        One Driver during a 4 month period 
Fixed Effects:         Medallion Level 
 
* Post fare increase = 0 for inspections that take place during the 365 days before each 
  fare change was implemented. 
   Post fare increase = 1 for inspections that take place during the 365 days beginning four 
  months after each fare change was implemented 
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Table 4: (Log) Miles Driven as a Function of the Fare Changes 
 
  (1)  (2) 
  OLS  Fixed Effects 
Post fare increase*  -0.0239  -0.0423 
  (0.00618)  (0.00374) 
ln(days since inspection)  0.633  0.792 
  (0.102)  (0.0643) 
February  -0.000746  0.0318 
  (0.0168)  (0.0906) 
March  -0.0293  -0.00251 
  (0.0154)  (0.0888) 
April  -0.00813  -0.0492 
  (0.0156)  (0.0888) 
May  0.0151  0.0219 
  (0.0180)  (0.0106) 
June  0.0426  0.0608 
  (0.0167)  (0.0904) 
July  -0.0154  0.0177 
  (0.0156)  (0.0888) 
August  -0.0107  -0.0393 
  (0.0154)  (0.0888) 
September  -0.0231  -0.0135 
  (0.0173)  (0.0100) 
October  -0.0125  0.0363 
  (0.0171)  (0.0908) 
November  -0.0300  -0.00338 
  (0.0154)  (0.0888) 
December  -0.00118  -0.0432 
  (0.0154)  (0.0888) 
Constant  6.489  5.726 
 
  (0.492)  (0.318) 
Observations  12281  12281 
R-squared  0.007  0.033 
# of Medallions    2514 
Standard errors in parentheses     
 
Unit of Observation:        One Driver during a 4 month period 
Fixed Effects:         Medallion Level 
 
* Post fare increase = 0 for inspections that take place during the 365 days before each 
  fare change was implemented. 
   Post fare increase = 1 for inspections that take place during the 365 days beginning four 




Table 5: (Log() Miles Driven as a Function of (Log) Revenue per Mile 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  OLS IV  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
IV 
ln(real revenue/mile)  -0.42  -0.13  -0.40  -0.23 
  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
ln(days since inspection)  0.63  0.63  0.72  0.79 
  (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
February  0.00  -0.00  0.02  0.04 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
March  -0.03  -0.03  -0.00  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
April  -0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
May  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
        (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
June  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
July  -0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
August  -0.02  -0.01  -0.05  -0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
September  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
October  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
November  -0.04  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
December  -0.03  -0.00  -0.05  -0.06 
  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.09) 
Constant  6.38  6.46  5.95  5.67 
  (0.31)  (0.48)  (0.18)  (0.31) 
Observations  33962  12281  33962  12244 
R-squared  0.06  0.03  0.07   
# of Medallions    2645    2514 
Standard errors in parentheses     
 
Unit of Observation:        One Driver during a 4 month period 
Instrument:          1996 fare increase and 2004 fare increase 













































Appendix:   Timeline regarding taxi decisions after 1998: 
 
May 13
th, 1998:  city wide taxi drivers strike 
 
May 28
th, 1998:  city wide taxi drivers strike 
http://socialjustice.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/index.php/Alliance_Achie
vements 
      ..\Labor Supply Project\Alliance_Achievements.htm   
   
 
March 2002:    New York City Taxi Workers Alliance organized forum to hear  
      taxi driver’s stories of their financial deterioration after September  
      11. Federal Emergency Management Agency had assisted taxi  
      garages and brokers but not the drivers and at this hearing, FEMA  
      officials heard the taxi drivers’ stories. Soon after, FEMA opened a 
      new Rental and Mortgage Assistance program- over 2,000 drivers  
      participated. 
http://socialjustice.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/index.php/Alliance_Achie
vements 




























th, 2003: “A group representing thousands of taxi drivers said it would  
      begin to push harder for an increase in fares, after a broad survey  
      of drivers found that many -- facing higher gas prices and a weak  
      economy -- are increasingly unable to support themselves with  
      their jobs.  The survey, to be released today, included 581 drivers  
      who were interviewed at Kennedy International and La Guardia  
      Airports last winter. It was the first time such a large group had  
      been interviewed by the New York Taxi Workers Alliance, which  
      represents 4,800 of the more than 40,000 licensed taxi drivers in  
      the city.” 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E1D7103DF9
3AA1575AC0A9659C8B63 
       
 
October 20
th, 2003:  “A group representing thousands of taxi drivers in New York City  
      is threatening a strike if the Taxi and Limousine Commission does  





st, 2004:  “A formal study ordered by the city has essentially cleared the way 
      for the largest taxicab-fleet expansion in nearly 70 years. It   
      concluded that adding 900 cabs over the next three years would not 
      pose environmental concerns and indicated that a moderate fare  
      ease would probably assuage taxi owners.” 
      “The intention is for 300 cabs to be added in each of the next three  
      years, with the first group expected to be cruising city streets by  
      June.” 
      http://wirednewyork.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4273 
      ..\Labor Supply Project\showthread.php.htm 
 
January 12
th, 2004:  “In recent months, drivers have threatened to strike if the fare is  
      not increased. Officials are currently proposing a 25 percent hike.” 
      http://www.gothamgazette.com/print/833 
      ..\Labor Supply Project\833.htm 
 
January 28
th, 2004:  Taxi and Limousine Commission officially proposes taxi fare  
      adjustment and service improvements. 
      http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/news/press04_01.shtml 
      ..\Labor Supply Project\press04_01.html 
      “The proposal comes in the midst of environmental reviews for  
      issuance of 900 additional taxicab licenses over three years, with  
      the first batch of 300 planned for issuance by the end of the current 
      fiscal year on June 30.” 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/transportation/20040224/16 
        /889




th, 2004:  Taxi and Limousine Commission officially approves a fare   
      increase of more than 26 percent, to take effect on Monday, May  




..\Labor Supply Project\fullpage.html 
“Most of the increase will end up in drivers' pockets, because the 
commission also ruled that lease caps - the maximum amount that 
fleet owners can charge drivers - can be raised by only 8 percent.” 
http://wirednewyork.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4273 
..\Labor Supply Project\showthread.php.htm 
“The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) 
today unanimously approved a proposed fare adjustment, as well 
as a package of service improvements designed to enhance the taxi 
riding experience. The new fare formula will be in effect as of 
12:01 a.m. Monday, May 3, 2004.” 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/news/press04_03_a.shtml 
..\Labor Supply Project\press04_03_a.html 
 
April 16
th, 2004:  “On April 16, bids for 174 medallions from corporations   ` 
      (medallion and/or fleet owners) were accepted.” 
 
April 23
rd, 2004:  “On April 23, 126 more new medallions were sold at a second bid  
      opening for individuals. . .” 
      “On April 16 and 23, the New York City Taxi and Limousine  
      Commission (TLC) opened some 664 bids for a total of 300 new  
      yellow taxi medallions being auctioned by the city.” 
      http://www.unitedspinal.org/publications/action/2004/06/25/new- 
      taxi-medallions-sold-no-access-achieved/ 
      ..\Labor Supply Project\Action Online » Blog Archive » New Taxi  
      Medallions Sold, No Access Achieved.htm 
 
May 3
rd, 2004:   Fare increase comes into effect. 
http://www.allbusiness.com/transportation-       
      communications/transportation-services/4156824-1.html  
      ..\Labor Supply Project\4156824-1.html 
 
May 4
th, 2004:   Fare increase noticeable in the data. 
 
 
 
 